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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NO. 03-3314

JOCELYN JOSEPH,
Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT,
Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent

On Petition for Review of Orders of the
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A77-013-254

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 12, 2004
Before: RENDELL, FISHER and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 29, 2004)

OPINION OF THE COURT

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Jocelyn Joseph, a citizen of Haiti, seeks review of two independent
decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), the first denying his motion to

reopen and the second denying his underlying application for asylum, withholding of
removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
jurisdiction to hear Joseph’s petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. For the reasons
discussed below, we will deny the petition.
I.
Jocelyn Joseph was a police officer in Haiti, responsible in part for investigating
gang-related activities. During routine duty, Joseph was ordered to arrest certain known
gang members by a local judge. Upon learning of the order, Joseph’s supervisor,
Commissioner Jean Claude Regure, told Joseph to ignore the judge’s command and not to
arrest the gang members. Over the commissioner’s instructions, Joseph investigated the
house where he knew the criminals to be. Upon entering he found, not only the suspects,
but also two police officers whom Joseph believed to be collaborating with the gang
members. Later, when Joseph arrested another individual affiliated with the same gang,
he was told by the arrestee that the commissioner was going to have him killed.
Joseph was transferred to another station, but claims that the retaliatory threats
continued, and that he was forced to sleep in the police station at night, because it was the
only reliable safe harbor. When the threats became intolerable, Joseph had his visa
doctored and came to the United States.
The Immigration Judge considered Joseph’s application for asylum and concluded
that Joseph did not qualify as a refugee under the Immigration and Naturalization Act,
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because he did not establish facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is
in danger because of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion. Recognizing that there might be instances where status as a
former police officer would be significant in establishing a fear of prosecution, the IJ
nonetheless concluded that Joseph’s fears arose from dangers encountered through
routine police service, and not as a result of his affiliations or immutable characteristics.
Joseph’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT
were denied and an order for removal was issued.
The BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s order on October 31, 2002. Joseph filed a
timely motion to reopen, based on his marriage to a permanent resident of the United
States, which the BIA denied on July 8, 2003. Joseph now petitions for review of the
BIA’s orders.
II.
Joseph first contests the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen. We review such a
denial for abuse of discretion. Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 170-1 (3d Cir. 2002).
Petitioners may move to reopen their proceedings upon the discovery of new facts,
supported by documentation, which might reverse the outcome of their hearings. 8
U.S.C. § 103.5 (2004). The Attorney General is granted “broad discretion” in granting or
denying such motions, and we review for abuse of discretion. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S.
314, 322-323 (1992).
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Joseph moved to reopen his BIA proceedings based on his application for
adjustment of status after his marriage to a permanent resident. As the BIA concluded in
disposing of his motion to reopen, and as Joseph concedes in the blue brief, he is
currently ineligible for adjustment of status, as an arriving alien in removal proceedings.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(c)(8) (2004). Joseph argues that the BIA had the authority to
reopen and thereby terminate the proceedings against him, which would then make him
eligible to adjust his status. See 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(c)(9)(iii)(C) (2004). However, the
BIA chose not to exercise that authority, and the petitioner offers no reason why the
BIA’s failure to reopen so as to terminate the proceedings was an abuse of discretion We
conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Joseph’s motion to reopen.
III.
Joseph also contests the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial of asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the CAT. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), a petition
for review must be filed no later than thirty days after the final order of removal. The
statute of limitations is not tolled by the filing of a subsequent motion to reopen. See
Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 394-395 (1995); Nocon v. INS, 789 F.2d 1028 (1986). 1 The
initial order of the BIA, is final and immediately appealable; later filings are irrelevant to

Although both Stone and Nocon concern orders of deportation, rather than removal, no
statutory or regulatory distinction is drawn for the purposes of reopening. See 8 U.S.C. §
1252; 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1.
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the limitations period.2
Joseph filed his petition for review on August 6, 2003, well after the thirty-day
window to appeal the BIA’s October 31, 2002 order had closed.3 Because the statute of
limitations has run, we may not revisit the merits of Joseph’s application for asylum,
withholding of removal and protections under the Convention Against Torture.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review will be denied.

The Court in Stone noted that the statutory text of 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), since moved to
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6), provides that the motion to reopen should be consolidated with the
underlying order, but not vice versa. As the Court concluded, “[T]he statute is best
understood as reflecting an intent on the part of Congress that deportation orders are to be
reviewed in a timely fashion after issuance, irrespective of the later filing of a motion to
reopen or reconsider.”
We note as a second procedural defect that Joseph only petitioned for review of his
motion to reopen. Under Stone, both the BIA’s order of removal and the order denying
Joseph’s motion to reopen are final orders, each of which must be petitioned to this Court.
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